ABSTRACT Device fingerprinting has lately received great attention due to its effectiveness in fraud detection, secure authentication, and user tracking. Whereas fingerprinting performs well on labeled device data using classification methods, there are several researches concentrated on unlabeled mobile device data and existing methods often lack in precision and efficiency. To overcome this challenge, we focus on the use of the mobile device's configuration-related characteristics as a mean to build a device fingerprint, which allows to distinctively and reliably characterize each device. In addition, an incremental clustering approach is proposed to classify unlabeled device data into clusters on the basis of their similarity. Moreover, we customize individual distance threshold for each user according to their device configurations' modifying frequency, in order to construct a precise authentication mechanism between users and devices. The proposed clustering model and device fingerprinting system are evaluated on 8220 fingerprints from 815 different devices. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet Finance and electronic commerce, various traditional businesses shift from offline to online, and mobile devices are ubiquitously used for online payment, asset management and so on. However, while the Internet provides us with great convenience, numerous data breaches result in the disclosure of user passwords, threatening user privacy and property safety. Besides, along with the tendency of users to either choose weak passwords or re-use passwords between different websites, passwords are no longer fitting for strong authentication. As a countermeasure to these threats, device fingerprinting has recently gained in popularity. It is utilized to authenticate a user's device and to detect malicious activity like account fraud: if a user performs a log from a device never used before, this might be deemed suspicious. If a user logs in from a trusted device which is authenticated to be the user's device, it is probably a legitimate login. Several studies [1] - [4] demonstrate that device fingerprinting technology works well in practice for fraud detection, spam registration, account theft or anomaly login.
In recent years, many features and methods have been proposed to identify desktop computers, from traditional evercookie [5] , HTML5 canvas [6] to clock skew based and cookieless fingerprints [7] - [9] . As the battleground shifts to mobile platforms (especially Android based mobile phones), which have replaced desktop computers for many usage scenarios [10] - [12] , tracking of such devices is more relevant. Since mobile devices are rarely customized and therefore do not have as many distinguishing features as desktop computers, alternative methods for mobile device identification have been proposed. Some works use specific traces, like embedded acoustic components [13] , [14] , inaudible sound [15] and motion sensors track [16] , [17] as device fingerprints. Other works [18] - [20] leverage the imperfections of accelerometers, such as Acceleration, Magnetic Field, Gyroscope and Gravity etc., to create device fingerprints. Furthermore, Hupperich et al. [1] take into account the combination of multiple sensors, achieving recognition rates of up to 99.99%. However, none of these studies take unlabeled device data into consideration, which is ubiquitous in the practical application scenario of device fingerprint. In other words, all these works regard device fingerprint identification task as a multi-class classification problem, which requires a set of classes to learn from.
In an attempt to overcome these shortcomings, Kurtz et al. [21] propose a supervised learning approach that is able to make correct decisions during testing, even if data from unlabeled devices is received. Hupperich et al. [22] introduce a nearest-neighbor matching approach to perform the detection of known and unknown devices, taking into account the combination of browser, system, hardware, and behavioral features to improve fingerprint reliability. Nevertheless, it should be noted that very little optimization work has been carried out on the efficiency of device authentication in the above works. More specifically, existing methods tend to traverse all the historical device data in order to identify new device data [21] , [22] , which is inefficient especially when there is tremendous device data in history. Furthermore, existing methods often lack in precision for mobile devices, as shown by recent studies [23] . To our knowledge, the lack of user customization may account for low accuracy to some extent. There is thereby an urgent need but it is still a significant challenge to construct an accuracy and efficient device fingerprint identification system on mobile devices on the basis of unlabeled device data.
As we all know, the cluster centroid in most of cluster algorithms can be regarded as the center of the whole cluster, therefore can represent all samples in the cluster. Based on this idea, instead of traversing all data, we can assemble one device's data into a cluster, and choose the most representative data as centroid to identify new data. From the perspective of unlabeled device data, clustering approaches suit this problem as well. Unfortunately, standard clustering algorithms like K-means [24] and K-medoids [25] often pre-specify the number of clusters k by randomly selection or multiple experimental testing, which are not designed to generate new clusters as new classes of data are received in an ongoing process. Although density-based spatial clustering algorithms like DBSCAN [26] are able to automatically find the appropriate number of clusters by choosing a density threshold, they consider reliable points with density values above the threshold, which can lead to low density clusters being classified as noise. More importantly, since DBSCAN need to select core samples of high density in advance before the actual clustering procedure, it works well for static dataset but is unsuitable for incremental clustering, while it is necessary to deal with new device data in the process of real-time device fingerprint identification. In addition, it is computationally costly [27] .
Here, we propose an alternative incremental clustering approach. In this method, clusters are groups of data characterized by a small distance to the cluster center and each cluster is represented by one of the objects in the cluster. Similar to DBSCAN, it is able to automatically find the adequate number of clusters. However, unlike DBSCAN, our procedure does not introduce a noise-signal cutoff. This means that even if there is only one data in a device set, it will be regarded as an individual cluster, instead of a noise. These ideas form the basis of our incremental clustering approach in which new clusters are created dynamically based on empirical threshold, even if unlabeled data from new devices is received in real time. Experimental results show that our algorithm achieves comparable performance over other existing clustering algorithms.
In this paper, we focused on the adoption of the mobile device's configuration characteristics as a mean to find a fingerprint and to recognize device. Firstly, we systematically analyzed the Android SDK for distinguishable fingerprint features, and accumulatively collected 8220 device data in real world, which came from a total of 815 devices. Secondly, we made a detailed analysis of the data and found that different users have different operating habits on the device. In addition, we analyzed three explicit identifiers including AndroidID, serial number and MAC address in real data sets, demonstrating the reason why it cannot uniquely identify the device. Following this, we proposed a robust solution for measuring the general distance between any pair of device data, and then presented the device fingerprint identification algorithm to authenticate user's device. Finally, we conducted two experiments with explicit identifiers and no explicit identifiers, respectively. This approach enables us to uniquely identify devices with a total accuracy of 99.97% when all 29 features are included.
In summary, we make the following contributions: 1) An incremental clustering algorithm is presented to deal with a large quantity of unlabeled device data, which can gather data from the same device into a cluster and dynamically generate new clusters as new devices arrive. 2) We provide a comprehensive analysis of device data and combine both explicit identifiers and implicit identifiers to recognize device. Also, we analyze the relationship between users and their device data's modification frequency, and compute an individual distance threshold for each user for device fingerprint authentication. 3) We propose an efficient and highly accurate device fingerprinting system based on 29 device's configuration characteristics that result from a systematic study of explicit and implicit identifiers. In the process of device fingerprint authentication, the samples to be authenticated are compared with the cluster centers rather than all the device samples, which improves the efficiency of real-time device fingerprint authentication. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the structure of the device fingerprinting system. We then introduce data collection methods and formulate the approaches of implementing clustering and mobile device identification in Section III. Next, we analyze the device data and conduct experimental evaluations in Section IV. Finally, in section V we present our conclusions on the practice of using mobile device fingerprinting and propose directions for further research.
II. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The device fingerprinting system proposed in this paper includes two stages: model construction and device identification. It consists of data collection module, data VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 1. Device fingerprinting system structure.
preprocessing module, clustering module and device fingerprint identification module. These modules interact with three databases, including device raw data database (Original DB), device fingerprint database (Fingerprint DB) and device fingerprint benchmark database (Benchmark DB). The structure of device fingerprint identification system is depicted in Figure 1 .
In the stage of model construction, all training data is clustered by an incremental clustering algorithm, and device fingerprint benchmark database composed of the centroid of every cluster is established. In the device identification stage, the device data is matched with the server-side device benchmarks one by one in order to obtain the identification results.
When a user entered username and password and successfully logged in on the mobile device, firstly, all the information freely available via SDK was collected by data collection module and uploaded to the server-side device original data database (Original DB). Secondly, the device fingerprint was generated by the data preprocessing module and saved in the device fingerprint database (Fingerprint DB). Finally, the fingerprint was authenticated by device fingerprint identification module, resulting either in a match which represents a trusted device or a reject possibly indicating an illegal one. Figure 1 illustrates this procedure.
In practice, if a device is recognized as illegal, instead of failing the authentication immediately, the system may perform secondary authentication through SMS, email, etc. If the user passes the secondary authentication, the device should be added to the device fingerprint benchmark database, ensuring that the user passes the fingerprint authentication when using the device again. 1) Data Collection Data collection module collected the device identifiers by calling the system API and executing Linux shell command, which were then formatted as a list of (identifier, value) pairs and saved in the HashMap Objects. Afterwards, the data was serialized into a JSON format string and sent to a web service by means of HTTP-POST. Finally, 29 features were parsed out of the raw device data, and then saved in the device original data database (namely, Original DB).
2) Data Preprocessing
Once the collection process was completed, we loaded device raw data from Original DB and performed cryptographic hash [28] for all non-numerical features using data processing module. By this procedure, every unique value of features will be transformed to a oneto-one corresponding hash number so that every feature can be expressed as a numerical value, enabling fast comparisons in further analyses. Furthermore, each device fingerprint was generated from all 29 numerical features, which was then sent to device fingerprint database (namely, Fingerprint DB).
3) Clustering
After data preprocessing, each raw device data was represented by a device fingerprint which is stored in Fingerprint DB. The clustering module then performed incremental clustering on these unlabeled device fingerprints on the basis of a distance metric we used to measure fingerprint similarity. In the process of clustering, the number of clusters is dynamically adjusted based on an empirical distance threshold. As a result, the reliable device fingerprint benchmark database (Benchmark DB) composed of the centroids of each cluster is established for identifying new data.
4) Device Fingerprint Identification
When a login request was received, the transmitted new device data was converted to corresponding device fingerprint by data preprocessing module. Then we computed the distance between the device fingerprint and all the fingerprint benchmarks stored in the Benchmark DB via device fingerprint identification module. If a matching device fingerprint benchmark is found, it is certified as a 'trusted' device, otherwise it is authenticated as an 'illegal' one.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the overall methodology that we used to evaluate whether a set of fingerprints can be effectively linked to an individual device.
A. DATA COLLECTION
We developed a data collection app in Android to collect raw data of devices' explicit and implicit identifiers from variety of mobile devices. In this module, we also apply the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission to acquire the MAC address of the device, which, along with other explicit identifiers, enables us to recognize specific devices as a ground truth. When a user logs from the app, the application collects device data and proceeds to store data on the memory of the device. Finally, each data set is compressed in a single zip file, which is sent, via HTTPPOST, to a dedicated server. By investigating the official Android developer documents of Google [29] and referring to the related work of device fingerprinting [21] , [22] , we study 29 explicit identifiers and implicit identifiers in total, as shown in Table 1 . Among these features, explicit identifiers, such as AndroidID, MAC, and serial number, were used to uniquely identify users or their devices in many cases [10] , [30] , [31] , but they are not completely reliable. Besides, implicit identifiers are composed of hardware-related attributes, software-related attributes and person-related attributes. Whereas hardware-related data (such as the device model) rarely change over the lifetime of a device, software-related data and person-related data (such as the operating system version and installed app) can have slightly different values over time. Take the case of software-related data, if the operating system is upgraded, the Android version will be change accordingly. In addition, person-related implicit identifiers (for example, automatic locking time and default font size, etc.), bound up with the user of the devices, can be viewed as a mirror of the user's behavior and personal preferences. It is interesting to note that some users frequently modify device attributes, while others rarely modify them, which allows flexible customization of model for every user in the process of device fingerprinting.
The features used for fingerprinting are of different data types including integer, float, hash, bit and string. A complete list of all the features, their data types and a real-world value is presented in Table 1 .
We collected almost 8,200 data records from 815 different devices. From a privacy point of view, we ensure that users of the app were aware of the fact that they participated in a scientific research and that we collected information in their mobile device. Additionally, we did not store any personally sensitive information like phone number and contact list, etc., which is collected in other papers [21] . Since we didn't collect user's account information, we assume that each of the 815 devices is corresponding to one independent user. Statistics show that almost 700 users accessed our system more than once.
Since all of device attributes are discrete values, it is time-consuming to compute their similarities and memory-consuming to store them in databases. Hence, we use the cryptographic hash function to digitize attributes described above and generate corresponding device fingerprints. Theoretical analysis shows that it can hold the essence between different values in categorical attributes. More importantly, in the field of device fingerprint identification with high demand for real-time detection, the numeric scheme improves the computational efficiency to a certain extent.
B. INCREMENTAL CLUSTERING ALGORITHM
The proposed incremental clustering algorithm is the pivotal of device fingerprinting system, mainly including the following three parts: distance measure function, cluster centroid computing and clustering algorithm.
1) DISTANCE MEASUREMENT
Distance measure function, used to calculate the distance between two samples, plays an important role in clustering algorithm. In the vector space model, the similarity between the samples can be expressed by the distance between two vectors, such as Euclidean distance and Martensitic distance etc.; however, as the fingerprint attributes are all discrete values and there is no "order" relationship between them, the similarity of the fingerprint cannot be accurately reflected by the above distance.
In information theory, the Hamming distance between two strings of equal length is the number of positions at which the corresponding symbols are different [32] . With reference to the hamming distance idea, we define the distance (dissimilarity) function between the feature vectors x, y in this way:
This index measures the distance between two samples, x and y, and takes values between 0 and 1, with F as number of features, and x i , y i represent the i-th feature of sample x and y respectively. Additionally, I(·) is an indicator function, having the value 1 if · is True and the value 0 if · is False. As all the features in x and y are encoded as numbers, they contribute to the distance only if they have different values.
2) CLUSTER CENTROID DETERMINING
In the clustering algorithm, how to determine the cluster centroids are a very critical issue. It should be selected as the cluster centroids that can represent the overall characteristics of the data in the cluster to the maximum extent.
Due to the fact that all the features of devices are categorical attributes, which are not measurable in Euclid space, it is inappropriate to create centroid by taking the mean of the coordinates of the data in the cluster. What is more, the device fingerprint centroid for one device should be an actual device data generally, rather than a combination of data records. Therefore, we choose the most representative device data, which is the most centrally located object in a cluster, as the centroid (also known as medoid).
The problem of selecting cluster centroid is to calculate the centroid for a weighted undirected graph, with the samples as vertices, and the distance between the samples as the weight of the edges. To simplify it, we take such sample as centroid, which has minimum total distance with all the other samples within the same cluster. The centroid for cluster C j can be expressed by:
where µ j represents the centroid for cluster C j , of which j is the cluster index. The cluster centroid maintains the original feature of the device fingerprint data, which conforms to the practical application of the device fingerprint.
3) CLUSTERING ALGORITHM
Clustering algorithm aims at grouping data into clusters that contain similar data points. As has already been mentioned, our incremental clustering approach allows us to create new clusters dynamically during clustering, based on empirical threshold.
Given one user's device records set (denoted by D), which includes q samples, incremental clustering algorithm clustered these data into k clusters. To begin with, one sample is randomly selected from the user's device dataset D and this sample is regarded as the initial cluster as well as the centroid of the cluster. After initialization, clustering algorithm consists of a looping between the following two steps. The first step computes the distance d(x i , µ j ) between sample x i and each centroid µ j to find the nearest centroid µ r to x i , where d is a distance function among fingerprint vectors, as in (1) . Subsequently, if the distance between x i and nearest centroid µ r is less than empirical threshold δ, we will assign the sample to the nearest cluster, suggesting a positive match with one of the centroids; otherwise a new cluster and centroid will be created and initialized by the sample x i , implying that this sample is not from any of the existing devices. The second step updates centroids for each cluster by calling the centroid determining method mentioned above. The incremental clustering algorithm repeats until the centroids and the cluster partition do not change significantly, as described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Incremental Clustering Algorithm
Input: Data set:D = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q }; Distance threshold parameter:δ. Output: Cluster separation:
. . , µ k }. initialize cluster number and cluster centroids:
find the nearest cluster to sample
assign the sample to the nearest cluster: C r = C r ∪ {x i } else create a new cluster C k+1 = {x i }, and initialize the new centroid µ k+1 = x i add the initial centroid vector to cluster centroids set: U = U ∪ {µ k+1 } update the total number of clusters: k = k + 1 endif endfor for j = 1, 2, . . . , k do update cluster centroid vectors: µ j = arg min x∈C j x,y∈C j ,x =y d(x, y) endfor initialize new set: C = U until the centroids do not move significantly After clustering, k clusters as well as their centroids are obtained, and each cluster is regarded as an individual device set. It should be noted that clustering algorithm works on one user's device data each time, and other users' data follow the same steps.
From the analysis in the section III.A, it is known that users have diverse operating habits on mobile phones: someone frequently modify the configuration setting of their device, such as modifying the lock time, installing and uninstalling apps etc., while the others rarely do. Complete details of this case will be further discussed below. Hence, we calculate the personized distance thresholds for each user specifically, according to their own habits. To be specific, users who frequently modify device information have relatively large intra-class distances and high thresholds; on the contrary, users who hardly ever change device information have smaller intra-class distances and low thresholds.
Let m be the total number of users who participated in our research, and n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n m be the number of devices records each user has logged in. At the end of clustering algorithm,Finally, m users' device data will be grouped into k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m clusters respectively, with corresponding k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m cluster centroids created, which is also known as device benchmarks. At the same time, the trusted distance thresholds of m users are calculated as δ = {δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . , δ m }. Finally, all users' distance thresholds and their devices' benchmarks are stored in the device fingerprint benchmark database, which are used to identify the newly-registered devices.
C. DEVICE FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION ALGORITHM
Device data was collected in chronological order and can be tested in the order of data arrival. Next, we take one user's test data as an example to describe the identification process. When a login request is received, we begin with converting original device data to corresponding fingerprint. To determine whether this new device fingerprint is coming from a certain user's device, we firstly check this device's user information. Then the device fingerprint is compared with all of this user's device benchmarks stored in the device fingerprint benchmark database. If the minimum distance between the fingerprint and benchmarks is less than δ, the sample was certified as a trusted device, otherwise it was authenticated as an illegal one. We formalize this algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 2 Device Fingerprint Identification Algorithm
Input: device fingerprint to be tested x; the corresponding user's device benchmarks in device fingerprint benchmark database: U = {µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ k }; and trusted distance threshold for the user: δ Output: the result of device identification(trusted device or illegal device). compute the distance d(x, µ j ) between x and each cluster centroid vector µ j (1 ≤ j ≤ k) find the nearest cluster to sample x, assuming the cluster index is r: r = arg min
the sample is certified as a trusted device, and divide the sample into: C r = C r ∪ {x} else the sample is certified as an illegal device endif It should be noted that, instead of traversing all the historical data of device, it is only necessary to match the new data with the centroids of clusters, which greatly improves VOLUME 6, 2018 the time performance of the device fingerprint identification system.
More importantly, during the actual application of the device fingerprinting system, if a certain device is authenticated as a trusted device, the user can log in successfully. Otherwise, if the authentication is illegal, a secondary authentication is required for this new device. As long as the new device passes the secondary authentication, a new cluster will be created and initialized by the device. In addition, it will be added to the device fingerprint benchmark database so as to successfully pass the authentication when logging in again. If the secondary authentication fails, the login will be refused. The specific process is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Device Fingerprint Benchmark Updating Algorithm
Input: device fingerprint x and the identification result Output: update device fingerprint benchmark database if it is certified as a trusted device then divide the sample into the nearest cluster: C r = C r ∪{x}, update the device fingerprint benchmark database regularly (for example, update once a day). else perform secondary authentication through SMS, email, etc.
if the device passes the secondary authentication then add a new cluster: C k+1 = {x}, and initialize the centroid vector: µ k+1 = x endif endif Considering that the device fingerprint is relatively stable in a short time, there is no need to update the device fingerprint benchmark database in real time in the process of device fingerprint identification, unless the device is certified as illegal and passes the secondary authentication simultaneously. It only needs to update regularly when the server is idle, thus saving the memory space and computing resources in the server side.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the experimental data in detail, and present the determination scheme of threshold parameters, experimental setting as well as performance metrics. Finally, the evaluation results are obtained based on real-world data.
A. SAMPLE DATA ANALYSIS
In practice, individual fingerprint features change over time as the device is used. We observed that almost 95% of the data records transmitted to server came from recurring devices, which visited our system two or more times. This allowed us to observe the change in data over time and to study the diversity and stability of these attributes. The more different values a feature has, the more diverse it is. In turn, the fewer the feature changes, the more stable it is.
To evaluate how diverse the feature is, we first counted the different values of each feature in 815 device fingerprints, as 'Number of Values' shown in the third column of Table 2 . In the data set, there may be multiple fingerprints corresponding to each device, and we consider only the newest fingerprint in feature analysis.
It can be seen from Table 4 that there are 815 different AndroidId, systemDirectoryStruct as well as systemAppList for the 815 Android devices respectively, and almost all of the devices can be uniquely identified by these feature. Thus, these feature have a high level of diversity. In the next place, serialNumber, appList and fontList are also quite diverse as the number of value is more than 800. On the contrary, there are some attributes, like wifiRemind, timeFormat, language and getLocationMethod, are less diverse as demonstrated in the table. This could be because these attributes are either Boolean type or enumeration type, which only have several values to choose.
In the data set, a single device may correspond to a series of login records. The fingerprint of a device is constantly changing due to system updating, configuration, and application installation. In order to determine how often individual feature changes over time, we grouped all the available records by device and studied each group containing more than one data in detail. As can be seen from the fourth column ('Number of Changes') of Table 2 , we counted the number of changes for each feature. To be specific, for each data chronologically in the same device group, if one certain feature of the data has changed compared to the previous data, then its number of changes was increased by 1. And then the final number of changers for each feature was calculated by adding the change number from every device together. The metric indicated the stability of these features in identical devices.
From this table, we can see that the structure of system directory, list of fonts changes, as expected, very frequently over time, and so the stability of these feature is poor. What's more, the installed apps, IP address also often changed, but they are slightly more stable compared with the former. Some of the hardware-related attributes, such as screen resolution, device model, device brand and CPUCore etc., change only on a few devices. This is hardly surprising, as this setting is set by the carrier. Although some of the person-related attributes like notification of wifi available, time format and time zone turned out to be most stable, they were either Boolean values or single value and therefore carry less information. Among the features with higher diversity, the AndroidID, serial number, MAC address, system core information and userAgent were the most stable ones.
We further analyzed three explicit identifiers, i.e., AndroidID, serialNumber and MAC address, to study their characteristics and evaluate whether they contributed to the device fingerprint identification. From Table 2 one can concluded that most of the devices can be uniquely identified by AndroidID, as it is most diverse and several changes over time. There is no denying that this feature has a high level of dis- crimination, but, when the device is reset to factory settings, the AndroidID may change accordingly. As for serialNumber, however, it has been found that there are multiple different devices corresponding to the same serialNumber value, and these devices are even derived from different device manufacturers. Additionally, the serialNumber of 17 data has an invalid value of 'unknown'. Meanwhile, it should be pointed out that the acquisition of MAC address requires access to ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, and we got 98 invalid value due to the lack of the permission. Moreover, there may be multiple MAC address values for a device, and multiple devices may share the same MAC address value. In addition to the situations mentioned above, these explicit identifiers may be maliciously falsified by fraudsters. On the basis of these results we concluded that these explicit identifiers cannot uniquely identify a device, which confirms our initial assumption that device's configuration features, as a supplement to explicit identifiers, might be well suited for fingerprinting purposes.
Furthermore, we chosen 73 users, whose visit times is more than 10, and grouped all the available records by user to evaluate how much fingerprints changed by users per visit. As described in Figure 2 , on the x axis we report user index, whilst on the y axis we report the average number of attributes changed by user per access, shortened to Average Changed Number (per access). To be specific, we group all the device data by user, and then each user's Average Changed Number (per access) equals the quotient of the sum of all attributes' change times and the total number of the user's accesses.
Statistics shows that about 7% of the users did not modify the devices' configuration settings during the experimental study period, 52% of the users modified 1 field on average every two times, and the change frequency was relatively low. Besides, 27% users modified 1 field on average each time, and the rest 14% of the users modified 2 or more fields each time, corresponding to higher modification frequency. On the basis of our findings, it can be concluded that the change frequency of device setting information is bound up with the device owner's behavioral preference. Some users are accustomed to using the default settings and do not change them anymore, while the others tend to modify these settings often, such as frequently installing or uninstalling applications, or changing input method once in a while. Based on this finding, we refine the device fingerprinting model by means of customizing individual threshold parameters for each user, which offers an excellent research orientation of improving the performance of identity authentication.
B. DISTANCE THRESHOLD DETERMINING
For the considerable unlabeled device data in practical applications, it is hard to cluster and analyze them without any prior knowledge. Because different devices data are independent and identically distributed, the data distribution between labeled data and unlabeled data is identical. Therefore, we collected a batch of labeled device data in the laboratory and roughly calculated the average inter-class distance and intra-class distance of the labeled samples. Then, we evaluated the performance of our identification algorithm on the split of training data across the parameter space. Finally, the threshold producing the highest total accuracy was chosen as initial distance threshold, which is applied to unsupervised learning problem. The algorithm for determining the distance threshold is described in Algorithm 4.
Based on the distance threshold δ, we perform incremental clustering on each user's device data respectively. As the result of clustering, we obtain the clustering partition for each user, which is then taken as the input of distance threshold VOLUME 6, 2018
Algorithm 4 Device Fingerprint Benchmark Updating Algorithm
Input: a small amount of labeled dataset C = t j=1 C j where C j = ∅ is a set of samples belonging to the j-th device Output: distance threshold parameter δ for j = 1, 2, . . . , t do compute average intra-cluster distance:
compute average inter-cluster distance:
, where accuracy is a metric used to measure the device identification algorithm (see below). determining algorithm to compute an individual threshold for each user. In particularly, if there is only one cluster for a user, we randomly select other user's device data as its negative samples to compute inter-cluster distance (that is D out in the algorithm). Finally, the trusted distance thresholds of m users are calculated as δ = {δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . , δ m }, which are saved in the benchmark database.
C. EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
In order to evaluate the robustness and invariance of the fingerprinting system we proposed, several tests have been conducted. Experimental tests have been carried out on 815 Android devices described in section IV.A, which were heterogeneously selected among different brands and models.
The decision as to whether two or more fingerprints come from the same device is made on the basis of their distance (see Section III.B.1)). More specifically, we developed a device fingerprinting system that can recognize both access from a user's unknown device (either a user's new device or other uses' device) and multiple accesses of the user's existing devices.
For this experiment, we considered all real-world samples in the dataset as trusted (positive) samples. As illegal (negative) samples, we replaced all 29 device features of positive sample by randomly selecting feature values that belonged to other users' devices, for the purpose of verifying the device fingerprinting system's ability to detect unknown devices during testing.
We split the dataset into training and test sets without modifying their chronological order. The training set is used to evaluate the performance of our identification algorithm across the parameter space before creating a model and testing the test set. we use a split of 80% of the data for training and 20% for testing. Considering the illegal samples constructed previously, the testing set consists of 1644 posi- tive samples and the same number of negative samples, that is, there are 3288 test data in total.
To verify the performance of incremental clustering algorithm and fingerprinting system, we designed two sets of experiments as follows: 1) Incremental clustering algorithm is conducted according to Algorithm 3, and the clustering performance is calculated according to device label. Besides, we compare the cluster result of DBSCAN with our incremental clustering algorithm and analyze the reason why DBSCAN is unsuitable for device identification. 2) Device fingerprint identification experiment: We designed a set of comparison experiments in the fingerprinting task to detect users' unknown devices, and to match at the same time known devices to the correct ones. The first experiment uses all device identifiers, including explicit identifiers and implicit identifiers, to authenticate the device. As a contrast, the second experiment only selects 26 implicit identifiers other than MAC, AndroidID, and SerialNumber for authentication. One of the goals is to analyze the contribution of explicit identifiers on device fingerprinting through comparative experiments. It is worthwhile mentioning that the updating strategy of device fingerprint benchmark in our experiment, which is slightly different from the Algorithm 3, does not involve dynamic secondary authentication process.
As an alternative, if the device is authenticated as an illegal one, the user's device will be added to the benchmark database.
D. PERFORMANCE METRICS
There are four results for device fingerprint authentication, as shown in the confusion matrix in Table 3 , where true positive (TP) and true negative (TN) refer to the number of samples that are correctly classified as credible and illegal, respectively. Similarly, we compute the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) as the number of wrongly accepted and wrongly rejected samples, respectively. We then compute accuracy, false accepted rate, and the false rejected rate using the following equations: 1) Accuracy: refers to the proportion of samples that are correctly classified to the total number of samples. The higher the accuracy, the better.
2) False Accepted Rate (FAR): refers to the proportion of illegal samples that are certified as credible to all illegal samples, that is, false positive rate [33] . The lower the false accepted rate, the better.
3) False Rejected Rate (FRR): refers to the percentage of credible samples that are certified as illegal in all credible samples, that is, 1-true positive rate [33] . The lower the false rejected rate, the better.
E. CLUSTERING EXPERIMENT
To evaluate the incremental clustering algorithm, we labeled all 8220 data based on multiple attributes (such as device's MAC address, AndroidId and so on) as a ground truth. We performed incremental clustering algorithm on every user's data samples and grouped them into clusters. As a result of clustering, each sample is assigned to one cluster.
As we all know, evaluating the performance of a clustering algorithm is not as trivial as counting the number of errors or the precision and recall of a supervised classification algorithm. In order to make scientific and quantitative measurements of clustering algorithm, we adopt several standard metrics referring to [34] , including Adjusted Rand Index (ARI), Adjusted Mutual Information (AMI), homogeneity, completeness and v_measure. To be specific, given the knowledge of the ground truth class assignments 'labels_true' and our clustering algorithm assignments of the same samples 'labels_predict', the ARI is a function that measures the similarity of the two assignments, while the AMI is a function that measures the agreement of the two assignments, ignoring permutations. Besides, Rosenberg and Hirschberg [35] define the homogeneity and completeness for any cluster assignment, where a high homogeneity means that each cluster contains only members of a single class, and a high completeness means that all members of a given class are assigned to the same cluster. They further define v_measure as the harmonic mean of homogeneity and completeness, which can be used to evaluate the agreement of two independent assignments on the same dataset. In practice, as many users and devices visit our system at a low frequency, which is very common in the device fingerprint application scenarios, we regard the number of noise points and clusters as supplementary metrics to evaluate clustering algorithm.
To gain a better understanding of why DBSCAN is unsuitable for device fingerprint authentication, we conducted several experiments using DBSCAN under the same experimental conditions (with same distance measurement function and same distance threshold), serving as a contrast to our incremental clustering algorithm. The result is shown in Table 4 and Table 5 .
As shown in Table 4 , we can find that the incremental clustering algorithm clustered 815 devices into 820 clusters, with no noise point discarded. When more device data are included, the data of some devices are split in two clusters, but still all the clusters remain pure, namely include only data of the same device, which is consistent with the high homogeneity shown in Table 5 .
In DBSCAN method, the minPts (as shown in Table 5 ) refers to the number of samples in a neighborhood for a point to be considered as a core point. In addition, it is generally accepted that minPts must be chosen at least 3 [36] . As shown in Table 5 , when the minPts is set to 3, there are 671 data points with densities lower than the threshold are discarded as noise. The probable reason for this is that many users and devices visit our system less than three times. As we can see from Table 5 , the bigger the minPts (for example, 5 or 10), the more the noise points.
In further tests, we compared incremental clustering algorithm with DBSCAN in terms of ARI, AMI, homogeneity, completeness and v_measure. As can be seen from Table 5 , when minPts is set to 1 in DBSCAN, it achieved a higher AMI and completeness than incremental clustering algorithm, a comparative v_measure, but a lower ARI and homogeneity. This result indicates that DBSAN perform well on detecting samples from the same class regardless of the dataset size, whereas our approach outperforms in keeping cluster pure and homogeneous. However, when we then increased the minPts from 1 to 10 step by step, the overall performance of DBSCAN decreased, with ARI and AMI being reduced by more than 40%, v_measure decreased by around 25%, which is far behind those of our algorithm.
More importantly, even though the overall performance of DBSCAN is better than incremental clustering algorithm with the minPts set to 1, it works only for static dataset. Since there is no cluster center in DBSCAN, it needs to regroup all data when new data is coming, which is extremely time-consuming. From the results we have obtained, one can conclude that the incremental clustering algorithm performs well in unlabeled device data. On the one hand, it overcomes the shortcomings of the standard clustering algorithm which cannot create new clusters dynamically as new classes of data are received. On the other hand, it can cluster new data incrementally while achieving comparable performance over DBSCAN. 
F. DEVICE FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION EXPERIMENT
We evaluated the performance of our identification algorithm on the split of training data with all 29 identifiers and studied the evolution of the training accuracy, FAR, FRR in relation to the threshold respectively, as is illustrated in Figure 3 . With the increasing of threshold, the FAR stably increased and the FRR stably decreased, while the recognizing accuracy appeared increased firstly then decreased, and reached the maximum value at a trade-off between FAR and FRR.
A high false rejected rate means that users are required to perform secondary authentication frequently, resulting in bad user experience. On the contrast, to reduce the false rejection rate, the cost is to accept more illegal device logins. A more conservative classifier that rejects more instances will have lower FAR but higher FRR, and vice-versa. Figure 4 shows the relation between the two metrics during training. The optimal operating point of any classifier is located at (0, 0). The best possible performance point will, therefore, be achieved at the point in the curve closest to this optimal point. The ultimate goal of our device fingerprinting system is to improve the system accuracy as much as possible and realize the trade-off between false accepted rate and false rejected rate.
To gain more insight, we deeply investigated the samples which are false accepted and false rejected respectively. In fact, the false accepted samples are extremely similar with user's trusted samples, one possible reason is that these two devices are custom machines of uniform device models produced by the same manufacturer. Besides, we observed that most of the false rejected samples were considerably modified by users before the recent logon. For instance, users may reset the device factory settings, causing multiple device configuration to change. As a result, the distance between the new sample and original device sample will exceed the distance threshold, and the new sample will be wrongly identified as user's new device.
Based on the clustering data and the established device fingerprint benchmarks, we verified the performances of our system on the corresponding test set by strictly following the algorithm that we proposed in Section III. It is noteworthy that the essence of the testing algorithm is to test the authentication result of each fingerprint independently, assuming that before each iteration of fingerprint authentication, the information in the fingerprint database is correct and identification error will not be transmitted. In this paper, two fingerprint authentication experiments are designed, and different device identifiers sets are selected, as described particularly in section IV.C. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the training accuracy, FRR and FAR in relation to the threshold. We chose the best threshold to evaluate different combinations of features and conducted 10 experiments for each combination respectively, the averaged results are presented in Table 6 . In an initial test run, we included all features (explicit identifiers and implicit identifiers) in our analysis. In doing so, we achieved a top testing accuracy of 99.97%. This feature combination enabled a false rejected rate of 0.06%, with zero sample falsely accepted. In the next step, we divided the feature space and examined whether or not the combination of explicit identifiers and implicit identifiers achieve better performance than the latter only. In this case, we achieved our hitherto best accuracy of 98.99%, with false rejected rate being increased by around 1.8% and a slightly increase on false accepted rate.
From the results we have obtained, one can conclude that compared with only using implicit features, the combination of explicit and implicit identifiers is more accuracy in uniquely identify devices, with FAR and FRR being reduced simultaneously. In other words, even if the explicit identifiers cannot uniquely identify a device, it makes a great contribution to the device fingerprint identification. Simulation tests show that the identification system can stand with suspicious attacks, filtrate out invalid login requests availably, and have advantages of good robustness and reliability.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of fingerprinting based on device's configurations. The incremental clustering algorithm proposed in this paper can create new clusters dynamically as new classes of data arrives, achieving comparable performance over other existing clustering algorithm.
Based on the finding that different users have different frequency of device information modification, we compute individual trusted distance threshold for each user. Moreover, the quantitative evaluation has shown that there is a trade-off between false accepted rate and false rejected rate, depending on the trusted distance threshold. Our measurement study indicated that device fingerprint identification algorithm we proposed achieved the total accuracy of 98.99% when we only use implicit identifiers set, even if individual feature values change over time. Furthermore, combining implicit identifiers with explicit identifiers lead to an even better recognition accuracy of 99.97%.
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